Touadéra Consolidates Power by Discarding Allies

Thierry Patrick Akoloza en Pleine Emission a la Radio Ndeke Luka
Photo via Corbeaunews-centrafrique

President Faustin-Archange Touadéra is consolidating personal power around his clan, pursuing a strategy of personal power consolidation, by marginalizing former allies, according to a report published on May 26, 2026. This strategy is illustrated by the cases of Gourna Zacko, Thierry Kamach and his party MOUNI, and the Be-Oko platform. Alliances with Touadéra appear to have a limited duration, with opponents and long-time allies reportedly used, weakened, and subsequently discarded. This approach suggests a deliberate effort to centralize authority and eliminate potential challenges to his rule, reshaping the political landscape of the Central African Republic.

Co-optation and Expulsion Tactics

The regime has employed manipulation and co-optation strategies, distributing posts and privileges to cadres from historical democratic opposition parties, according to a report published on May 26, 2026. This tactic effectively neutralizes opposition figures by integrating them into the government structure, often at the cost of their original party affiliations and principles. Within the Mouvement de Libération du Peuple Centrafricain (MLPC), led by Martin Ziguélé, Chantal Jean Édouard Koyambonou was appointed to a Minister of State position. This appointment was a key example of the regime's strategy to draw prominent figures from opposition ranks. Other high-ranking MLPC cadres, including Jackson Mazette, Stanislas Zoumbeti, and Étienne Malekoudou, reportedly received financial incentives, further illustrating the regime's method of securing loyalty or at least political quiescence through material benefits. The distribution of such privileges aims to weaken the internal cohesion of opposition parties and create internal divisions.

The Union pour le Renouveau Centrafricain (URCA), led by Anicet Georges Dologuélé, also experienced internal shifts, with André Nalké Dorogo defecting from the party. This defection served as another instance of the regime's successful efforts to fragment opposition movements by luring away key members. The Rassemblement Démocratique Centrafricain (RDC), the party of the late president André Kolingba, was similarly affected by these tactics, experiencing internal erosion as its members were targeted for co-optation. These maneuvers highlight a systematic approach to undermine established political parties and consolidate influence. Simplice Mathieu Sarandji, the executive secretary of the presidential party, reportedly worked to consolidate his own position against his rival, Évariste Ngamana, during this period, indicating internal power struggles even within the president's own political apparatus, which also contributed to the broader consolidation of power.

The Hôtel Ledger Turning Point

A strategic meeting held at the Hôtel Ledger in Bangui marked a turning point in what has been described as an authoritarian rupture. This event is seen as a clear demonstration of President Touadéra's intent to exert absolute control over legislative processes. President Faustin-Archange Touadéra arrived at the Hôtel Ledger meeting with a dictatorial agenda, according to reports, and proceeded to expel all elected officials from the MOUNI party who were present. This unprecedented move sent a strong message about the diminishing space for independent political action. During the meeting, Touadéra dictated that deputies must vote only for names on a single presented list, effectively removing any competitive process and ensuring that only his preferred candidates would be elected to key positions.

Following the gathering, all members of the bureau of the National Assembly were elected without real competition, a direct consequence of the president's directives at the Hôtel Ledger. This move further concentrated power within the president's circle, eroding democratic norms and the separation of powers. Subsequently, Thierry Kamach, the leader of the MOUNI party, was excluded from the government Moloua 3 without an official explanation provided by the administration. This exclusion, following his party's public humiliation at the Hôtel Ledger, showed the swift and decisive consequences for those perceived as disloyal or insufficiently compliant.

An unofficial justification circulated for Kamach's exclusion, suggesting it was because he was running for legislative office and should focus solely on his parliamentary mandate. This justification, however, was not formally issued by the government, leaving room for speculation that it was a pretext for his removal due to his perceived independent stance or the growing influence of his party. The MOUNI party and its leader had, in fact, contributed significantly to the support of the controversial constitutional referendum and the subsequent electoral process, making Kamach's marginalization particularly striking. The events surrounding the Hôtel Ledger meeting and its aftermath illustrate President Touadéra's strategy of consolidating power by marginalizing former allies and controlling legislative processes, even those who had previously provided key support to his agenda.

Marginalized Allies and Future Outlook

Allies who provided early support for President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, including their backing for the constitutional referendum and his re-election, are now facing sanctions, according to the report. These "allies of the first hour" are being systematically sidelined, indicating that their utility to the president's agenda may have diminished once their support for key political milestones was secured. Similarly, allies who joined later, grouped under the Union des forces démocratiques de l'opposition (UFDO), such as Eddy Symphorien Kparekouti, Chantal Jean Édouard Koyambonou, Jackson Mazette, Stanislas Zoumbeti, and Étienne Malekoudou, are reportedly being ignored. This suggests a pattern where both early supporters and later converts to Touadéra's cause are ultimately deemed expendable once their immediate political value is exhausted. The fact that these individuals, many of whom were co-opted from opposition parties, are now being ignored, notes the transient nature of alliances within the current political climate.

Sources close to the Palais de la Renaissance indicate that Touadéra attributes blame to dissidents from the Mouvement de Libération du Peuple Centrafricain (MLPC) for their failure to achieve specific political objectives. These objectives included the eviction of Martin Ziguélé from his position as leader of the MLPC and the election of at least one deputy representing their dissident faction. This internal criticism from the president's circle reveals the high expectations placed upon these co-opted figures and the consequences of failing to deliver on the president's political demands. The MOUNI party and its leader played a significant role in garnering support for the controversial constitutional referendum and the subsequent electoral process, which allowed President Touadéra to seek re-election and solidify his hold on power. Despite this key support, their subsequent marginalization shows the transactional nature of these political alliances. The report from May 26, 2026, concludes that this pattern of using, weakening, and discarding both opponents and long-time allies is a defining characteristic of President Touadéra's strategy for consolidating personal power around his clan, ultimately leading to an increasingly centralized and authoritarian political system.